I certainly do not see any scenario where Libya goes back to its slumber under Qadhdhafi (never mind the behaviour one can expect from him vis-a-vis Egypt and Tunisia, and the oil money to spend on that - yes Sullivan seems to see this in isolation, but as Shaheen has pointed out, pre-Rebellion in Libya, there were already signs of Qadhdhafi mucking round to support the anciens de Ben Ali, for negative effects to stability in Tunisia).

Putting Western 'boots on the ground' in Libya is madness. Providing logistical support and the morale boosting of giving at least Eastern Libya air cover is worth a shot. Sullivan on his blog rightly asks about Afghanistan - I'd say that Afghanistan is not worth American, British, French, German, other Nato soldiers lives. Wind it up.

Libya with vast petrol reserves, the potential to destabilize - by direct and indirect action - both Tunisia and Egypt, and also become a Somalia on the Med, well that is rather more of interest to both EU (well, US, France, UK, after the recent EU performance it's silly to talk of EU as an interest entity...). Were Libya say located where The Sudan is, I'd shrug and say "ah fuck it." However, it is not. It is smack dab between the two more-or-less successful regime change countries (Tun, Egp [I maintain my Egypt-skepticism, but comparatively), with enormous direct economic impact on each (literally millions of expat workers, for Tunisia substantial business/trade ties). In the real world, outside blogging and hand-waving, this has real impacts on those economies that have real impacts on their stability and ability to have a real shot at democracy.

There are various commentators also wringing their hands about the real character of the Rebels in the East. Not without a basis worrying of Al Qaeda ties and whether the 'real goals' of the Rebellion is democracy. I say, "Fine but rather bloody theoretical and precious at this stage."  Again the choice is not between supporting a Rebellion and say a Stable Regime. No, it is between bloody chaos, à la Chechnya, only this time on the Med and not safely tucked away in the remote Caucuses, and... a chance at not so much chaos. So again: the vote needs to be placed not in  contrast with some theoretical situation of stable Guide rule, but between likely end-result of The Guide winning (i.e. various levels of insurgency possible and Guide lashing out via support to radicals in neighbouring countries) and the potential to stop that.

I do hope the Western policy makers and the Egyptians now reported to be passing arms to the Rebels in the West (I hope that is true), are making realistic plans about giving logistical and practical support as touched on in earlier posts.