I didn't see this earlier... Reposting my comments from the Open Thread here, since that's where they belong best.

I saw Norman Finkelstein speak this week and he had an interesting take of the impact of current events on the power balance in the region. He still hesitated to call Tunisia and Egypt revolutions, and still just called them revolts, hoping that they would properly conclude their stated goals as revolutions.

His take was that a democratic Egypt would not break the peace treaty with Israel. However, Egypt could then not counted on to stay neutral in the case that Israel wanted to attach another country, whether it be Lebanon again or launching a strike on Iran. The population would not want Egypt to stand idly in the case of an Israeli aggression.

He seemed to just think that Egypt would open the Rafah crossing, and that this wouldn't have consequences. Hajo Meyer, whom I saw speak earlier this year, thought that Israel would enter the Sinai again should that happen. (Mubarak hadn't yet fallen when this speculation was made.)

Whether the military is a caretaker government or re-asserts control, I don't think it would budge much on Rafah or Israel overall... Only under elected civilian control this might change.

I suspect King Abdullah would be amused by your description of Libya as being an affiliate of his country. He did, after all, accuse them of being behind an assassination plot. It's hard to slot Libya neatly into any of those three camps, although I suppose this is the least bad fit.

MMmmm I guess this analysis (w the Libya caveat noted by DW) makes a bit of sense of the East, but isn't of any utility for the Maghreb: and recall the Maghreb core (Alg, Mor, Tun) are ~70 millions.

I didn't describe Jordan as an affiliate of Libya or vice-versa, just both separately as loose affiliates of a Saudi orientation. (Both Israel and Saudi Arabia for example are American-oriented but hardly affiliates of each other.) (And hasn't Gadhdhafi been everyone's friend and enemy at some point?) Mostly I refer to Libya's recent America-Western reorientation, and that includes some cooperation with the regional Saudi orientation.

I do concede I get vaguer on the Maghreb and France is significant there, but with Gulf investment, etc. I don't imagine the Saudi orientation/influence is too small.

In the end, the analysis will hinge on who gives $$ to the security establishment of the regime? In countries like Libya which can afford its own, the affiliation is less; in Jordan where they have always been smart enough to "diversify" -- US, Britain, Saudi Arabia, even Israeli help offers in the past, and Iraq in the far old days -- the Saudi orientation is not iron clad. (In 1990 they gambled and lost on Iraq/Saddam.)

I saw Norman Finkelstein speak this week and he had an interesting take of the impact of current events on the power balance in the region. He still hesitated to call Tunisia and Egypt revolutions, and still just called them revolts, hoping that they would properly conclude their stated goals as revolutions.

Without actually hearing what he said, and without disdaining him personally, I nevertheless suspect that for Finkelstein, the only true metric of revolution as opposed to revolt is "did they do anything yet to publicly and really freak out America or the Israelis?"

To me the revolution idea is actually supported by the DEPRIORITIZATION of such issues. Addressing the internal dysfunctions as he priority is the real change, and remastering the social and psychological approaches to authority.

Certainly, a democratic Egypt would be several orders of magnitude more forceful against Israeli expansion, repression, and aggression. Cancelling Camp David would be too costly and internationally barely legal without a specific provocation.

Confronting Israel militarily and unprepared is what caused the original regime to lose its sources of income and become strictly a vampire state, as opposed to merely a totalitarian national socialist one, though a popular one.

should be -- "did they do anything publicly yet to really freak out America and/or the Israelis?"

D'oh! DW did mean Saudi Arabia; mixed up my Abdullah's.

I didn't mean it was a warm affiliation and I suspect that Qaddhafi is envious of Saudi Arabia being the dominant guy. Just they are on the same magnetic pole. The Sunni bloc. But Qadhdhafi would have perferred Saddam to dominate.

And assassinations shmassassinations, Corleones, Barzini's, Tattaglias. I mean Mubarak bombed or tried to bomb Ariel Sharon in his younger days. And the newly befriended USA -- USA killed Qaddhafi's daughter, qaddhafi did various mischief to USA.

Interests and common associations should predominate and I will bet official Saudia is rooting, with pinched noses, for Qadhhafi to win now.

I'm with Dubaiwalla here, I don't think Qaddafi is part of any sort of Saudi alliance, except very tangentially through his cooperation with the USA.

He's basically doing his own weird thing as far as foreign policy goes, and if anything he's closer to Iran/Syria than the Saudis. His relations to the Saudis appear quite strained, in fact, although both seem to have agreed to just keep a distance and not bother each other. Q has ceased involvement in most of the issues which would bring him into conflict with the Saudis. Not active on Palestine any more, for example -- in fact not doing much Arab politics at all. (Although he seems to have been involved in some minor way with the Zaydi rebels in n/w Yemen, which was not to the liking of either Sanaa or Riyadh.)

modified above per critiques, and background digging.

Finkelstein called Tunisia and Egypt revolts because it wasn't clear at the time whether the military would really turn over the countries to politically-elected leaders. Now with Tunisia's extradition request for Ben Ali, I think it's getting pretty clear that it will be a successful revolution, but when NF was speaking the Egyptian army had just asked people to stop striking. I have great hope but still serious doubts on what the army will do there, although I'm certain that it can't get back to Mubarak-style government.