Sorry, the card says ‘Moops’

The north is populated by the Moors (also Maure). These stubbornly Bedouin Arabs and Arabized Berbers have dominated the country since independence, despite being internally divided into several tens of rivalling tribes, and with a myriad additional alliances, protective-exploitative clan relationships, and Sufi bloodlines criss-crossing that whole structure. Towards the bottom of this monstrously complex ethnic web you will find the Haratine, a social caste of Black African origin now linguistically and culturally Arabized. These "Black Moors" -- some 40% of the total population -- are former slaves of the Bidane, or "White Moors" (~30%); indeed, many are still held in bondage. Slavery has been outlawed several times, of course (1960, 1980, 2007), but is still fairly widespread in rural areas, ranging from the rare extreme of whip-and-chain into a vast grey zone of social and economic dependency relations. However, as in other Sahelian locations -- e.g. Darfur -- actual skin color may vary considerably from the "black"/"white" appellations of communal self-consciousness and popular anthropology.

In the south, along the Senegal river valley, as well as in the major cities, are found another black population, the négro-mauritaniens, who make up the remaining near-third of the population. This is in fact several different ethnic groups, all joined to mother communities in Senegal and Mali: the Halpulaar (Peul, Fula), Wolof, Toucouleur, Soninké and Bambara. Many Western observers tend to assume that Mauritania is simply a question of white/black, or Arab/African, but this is emphatically not the case: these southern ethnicities are not to be confused with the Haratine. Further, the southern peoples are all different from one another, having little but skin color and a shared antipathy towards the Arab north in common, the latter thanks to brutal discrimination by Moorish rulers. Typically, their societies are based on the same sort of harsh-but-fluid internal class and descent stratification as Moorish society, including slavery.

Democracy à l’algérienne

The country was first set up as a one-party state under French favorite Mokhtar ould Daddah, but all collapsed in 1978, when he joined Morocco in a disastrous project to annex Western Sahara: a military coup followed, and then more military coups. In 1984, the Machiavellian machinery of junta politics spat out a certain col. Mouawia ould Sid’Ahmed el-Tayaa, whose glaring mediocrity seemed to have him slated for a few years as seat-filler until a real dictator could be found. But, to everyone’s surprise ould el-Tayaa managed to cling to power for a full 21 years, through one crisis after another. Not until 2005 was he finally deposed by a group of top-level colonels, several of them from the northern ouled bou Sbaa tribe. These gentlemen then set up a military junta which promised democracy and -- there is a first for everything -- delivered it.

Elections were held in 2006 and 2007 -- not perfect, but better than anyone had expected, and they gained some positively surprised commentary in Western media, after a decade-long news blackout on the country’s rather off-road political developments. Less noticed, however, was that the new rulers of Mauritania are essentially the old rulers of Mauritania, minus a few famous faces, and plus a few opposition characters. A former minister, Sidi ould Cheikh Abdellahi very narrowly defeated Ahmed ould Daddah (half-brother of the late Mokhtar) in the presidential elections, as front man for a coalition of former regime bigwigs and regional/tribal strongmen seeking to preserve the status quo. This constellation was widely believed to enjoy the tacit support of the junta, the leaders of which had for 20 years formed the hard core of ould Tayaa’s system. The public face of the coup had been col. Ely Ould Mohamed Vall, head of the Sûreté nationale. After the reinstatement of civilian rule, he has resigned his posts and seemingly disappeared from the political scene. But there remains the other main strongman, who has largely escaped media attention in the West: col. Mohamed ould Abdelaziz, head of the presidential security unit, BASEP. He remains very much at the center of things, now as head of the presidential staff. Around him gravitates a small galaxy of other colonels, businessmen and politicians, in an uneasy balance. However, all of this is largely impenetrable to the outsider -- truly algerianesque, in both its appearance and its implications for the political system.

Even with the colonels’ clique lurking in the background, the country’s political scene has been markedly liberalized. Difficult questions of southern rights, slavery and past abuses are discussed more freely than ever before, and even, sporadically, dealt with. But it is difficult to predict which way things will go. Just this month, president Abdellahi quietly dropped his post-election prime minister, Zeine ould Zeidane -- a former central banker who, in the presidential elections, was seen as the candidate of ould Tayaa’s economically powerful Smasside tribe, and had finished third. The new government is headed by Yahia ould Ahmed el-Waghf, who seems to be the president’s personal lapdog, and it is stuffed thick with former ould el-Tayaa apparatchiks. As before, the cabinet is ridiculously large (35 people), so as to guarantee a good spread of fancy titles and patronage. Interestingly, Islamists were given portfolios for the first time in the country's history, in the shape of the Tawassoul party, which is a local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood -- they seem to be a fairly moderate bunch. The Islamist scene has so far been splintered and all groups are weak, but by simultaneously building up an ally and opening the path to peaceful inclusion of Islamist forces, Abdellahi may well have made a very smart move -- although further politicization of religion (and vice versa) will undoubtedly follow as Islamists move into the center of politics. The deeply divided opposition is unhappy with just about everything, but can do little about it. To its credit, it seems grumblingly content to wait for new elections, and this makes Mauritania’s present problems essentially issues of economy and stability.

Enter Usama

In December last year, four French tourists were murdered, shocking the country and bringing a rare bout of international press attention. It was the first such crime in many years, and it soon emerged that the killers were members of a local Jihadi cell. A long manhunt began -- long, not least because Mauritanian police managed to show off a truly impressive range of police screwups. In the end, it seems some French gentlemen of unexplained organizational affiliations quietly arrived on the scene, and a couple of shootouts later, it was all over.

The manhunt, that is. But the dangers it pointed to, are with us very much still. For the incident underlines something very serious: that Mauritania is for all practical purposes an ideal target for al-Qa’ida, a schoolbook case of where Islamist rebels could find a foothold. Let’s simply list the many reasons for a Jihadi Salafist to fall in love with Mauritania. In no particular order:

- First & most obviously, it is vast and sparsely populated, with plenty of places to hide and borders guarded by no one.

- Equally obvious is that the country is poor – really, truly dirt-poor. Some newly discovered oil fields help (although they also help to sharpen internal power struggles), but, overall, the economy remains in miserable shape. The global food price rises have hit the population like a sledgehammer, and any hopes the government might have had for tourism have been shot down by al-Qai'da already. In fact, it took just a series of vague threats to cause the Paris-Dakar rally to flee to Latin America.

- It is thoroughly tribal. Al-Qai'da has, almost everywhere it goes, displayed an uncanny ability to merge with disgruntled tribals: witness Sinai, witness greater Pashtunistan. (On the semi-up side, witness Anbar.)

- And yet, it is not. The Haratine represent a largely detribalized, culturally rootless caste of difficult and degrading living conditions. Unsurprisingly, Islamist recruitment is said to have been especially effective among the upper stratum of politicizing Haratine.

- It's Muslim. And not just Muslim, but Islam is basically the only common identity of the country: the Islamic Republic of Mauritania, remember? Now, there’s absolutely nothing wrong with Islam per se, but cf. Pakistan, or even Israel, for examples of how, in conservative and chauvinist circles, a religiously defined national identity may go haywire in times of crisis.

- It’s just next door. Many will recall the 2006 creation of al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, a local branch of Usama’s organization. This is simply the new name for the GSPC, an Algerian rebel group whose core members have been active in the area for over a decade. A branch of the GSPC often sought hiding places in the Algerian-Malian borderlands, and while Algerian authorities have recently dealt a couple of tough blows on this front, the networks are still there. Simultaneously, as parts of Morocco’s Jihadist environment are presumably now merging into AQIM, another point of entry opens in the north, through Moroccan-occupied Western Sahara (although the angry young men in those areas are pretty much ear-marked for POLISARIO, the territory’s Algeria-allied independence movement).

- The regime is foreign-backed, with embarrassingly close ties to (first) France and (second) the USA. Most motivatingly for the Salafi crowd, Mauritania is one of only three Arab states to have official relations with Israel. These were established in 1999 by ould el-Tayaa, and are purely instrumental: quid-pro-quo for US backing. The Israel ties remain a serious irritant for much of the politically-minded population, and Islamist groups are squeezing every last drop out of this by staging demonstrations and attacks against the Israeli embassy.

- Perhaps most importantly, Mauritania’s traditional cultural paradigm is dissolving. The tribal system and Bedouin culture remain very strong, but they are now seriously challenged by phenomena such as increasing literacy, urban life, satellite TV, modern politics, and all the other causes & effects of modernization. Sufi folk religion is under pressure of the à la carte orthodoxy of a newly literate population, and traditional spiritual authority is withering. As everywhere else, this process is virtually certain to breed activist nativism -- here Islamism -- in response, aided by Islamist agitprop that already flows in copiously from the east, through TV broadcasts and Khaliji missions and money.

- Mauritania is also hit by destabilizing impulses from its neighbours. You have W. Sahara to the north: a large area of undetermined sovereignty, with POLISARIO controlling much of the borderlands and thousands of under-employed guerrillas roaming the territory. You have the Mali Touareg rebellion sputtering in the east; and, to a lesser extent, you have the issue of southern-Mauritanian refugees and ex-guerrillas in south, trickling home from Senegal. Added to this is a huge trade in refugees (towards the Canaries) and various related businesses that all empower extralegal networks. To its credit, Mauritania has absorbed all this surprisingly well so far, perhaps simply by not resisting it and letting people do as they please. But that’s exactly the kind of permitting environment a prospective Jihadist would seek, isn’t it?

- The state is very weak. The government is barely capable of stealing as much as it needs to keep the thieves-in-charge happy, despite the new oil income, and it exercises little effective control over the far-flung countryside. The antics of Mauritanian police forces during the al-Qaida chase instill no more confidence among Western states.

- Finally, Mauritania is in political transition. The post-2007 order doesn’t seem to haev settled down yet, and there has been a disturbingly quick turnover of top-ranking officers as of late, which indicates that all may not be well within the military establishment. On the plus side, this particular transition has so far been very benign, even positively liberalizing, and surprisingly stable. But still, where there's change there's uncertainty.

And so, when all is added together, it would seem that for Mauritania, troublesome times may lie ahead. For Western countries -- Mauritania’s neighbours are too preoccupied with their own petty squabbles to care -- this appears to be an excellent time to intervene, by pouring aid money into a country that will pass through multiple tough transitions over the coming years, and by supporting a political process which, while seriously flawed, is one few truly progressive developments in northern Africa. Sadly, of course, foreign aid and support tends to follow the TV cameras, and TV cameras rarely go anywhere where there is still peace and positive news. As far as most Western media and decision-makers are concerned, Mauritania seems to be on track and democratizing, and it has clearly been stricken from the list of need-to-fix troublespots. And so for the moment -- because there is a first for everything -- Mauritania seems trapped by its own success.