Excellent post that nicely ties up what's really happening beyond just Dar Fur or the South and why the government reacts the way it has over and over again.

A question if I may, how can outside actors like China positively influence the government to learn from its mistakes? I'm astonished when countries and companies seem to take little preventitive action and counsel to try to stem this, whether you're taking over-reactions in Dar Fur or pointless violent tactics in the Nigerian oil delta.

The Sudanese government is not the only one that is self interested, China has no motivating factor whatsoever to put any pressure on Sudan (unless another party puts pressure on China) as long as business is done. That's why sadly, the partnership is so lucrative for both.

I would assume China may actually profit from Sudan's isolation, and any behaviour leading to increased isolation as long as it doesn't result in serious trouble (that could potentially affect business), since an isolated government is forced to lean even harder on what support it has. So if there's an incentive for political action by China here, it probably isn't to restrain the government in Darfur...

On the fringes of this, what's up with Niger's expulsion of Arabs into Tchad? As I understand it, these Mahamid tribes are a sub-branch of the cross-border Rizeigat confederation, stretching from western Sudan to Niger, and it is tribes from Rizeigat/Mahamid that form the backbone of the Janjawid militias in Darfur -- and are also raiding into East Chad against both refugees and the Idriss regime. So, Niger's deporting another 150 K of angry and dispossessed Mahamid nomads into the other flank of Chad, I think could well turn out ugly for all involved. Yet the BBC doesn't seem to have made any connection yet between the Darfur/East Chad mess and this -- isn't there one, am I misunderstanding this?

(And even more on the fringes of all this: what on earth is up with Tchad's oil?)

Francis Fukayama has an interesting essay on the long-term implications of the Darfur crisis for state-building & sovereignty in Africa. Interesting points, but I'm not sure I buy the idea implied in his writing that every single separatist group in every single African (or wherever) country has to be given its own autonomous area or separate nation or whatever.

sounds like that Ralph Peters fella, except less dim.

I'm not sure about that, it seems to be on about Ralph Peters level.

f. fukuyama:

We of course want Africa to avoid the bloodshed that other parts of the world suffered in the state-building process, but we offer them only the freezing of the existing status quo and no route to the creation of more viable states with more rational borders.

... which is becaus ALL of Africa, and much of the rest of the world, was founded on the principle of respect for colonial borders. To start a major rearranging along ethnic lines would not only be unbelievably bloody, but also install two sets of recongnizable-but-unreconcilable borders, and create even more cause for conflict. Not to mention the fact that different ethnic groups have very different ideas of what territory belongs to whom, and have historically migrated quite a bit. That is precisely the problem with Darfur that he doesn't seem to understand:

[The Darfur rebel groups] represent the same ethnic group—indeed, the same tribe—as the one in power in neighboring Chad, and if African borders were drawn rationally to represent underlying ethnic and tribal realities, Darfur should be part of Chad and not Sudan.

This is bullshit. First of all, the rebels represent not "one" ethnic group or tribe, but several. The group he is referring to is the Zaghawa, to which Chad's ruler Idriss Deby belongs (as does much of the opposition against him), but they form only a small -- if militant -- minority in Darfur. The biggest Darfur tribe, Fur, which is also up in arms, has nothing to do with Chad -- or, at least, less than it has to do with the rest of Sudan.

The point is that there are no "rational borders representing the underlying tribal tructures" in this situation, since the tribes are inhabiting the same areas, migrating around, and virtually all have historical claims here. The pre-colonial situation was not that Darfur belonged to some Chadian Zaghawa entity, but that the Fur had a fairly recently created independent sultanate, which incorporated the surrounding tribes (incl. most of the areas Zaghawa) as semi-independent vassals. And even that arrangement shifted greatly over times, in respect to what tribes were involved, and what their relative strengths were. In Western Darfur, the Masalit, the third and smallest of the three main rebel tribes (there are a myriad of minor tribes/groups also involved in the uprising), had yet another independent sultanate in the borderlands with Chad, called Dar Masalit. They still preserve much of the 19th century governing structure there (or did until recently), and probably couldn't care less about if they belong to Chad or Sudan, as long as the Masalit hierarchies aren't being messed with (recently, they were, by Khartum: thus their part in the rebellion).

So, saying that the "Darfurians" should "belong to Chad" is a total misrepresentation of the situation, and no better than saying that "they should belong to Sudan". Worse, actually: at least the latter violates no colonial border and preserves the de facto links that were built up since colonialism started, who are every bit as important as the pre-colonial ones.

Even the rebels see this, very few demand independence.

The ceasefire that Bob Zoellick negotiated last May was yet another example of this: it did not address the larger question of Sudanese sovereignty over Darfur, and was rejected not by the Sudanese government, but by two of the three Darfurian rebel groups.

No, it very clearly does adress the larger question of Sudanese sovereignty over Darfur, in that it assumes that it will remain.

Interestingly sapping Fukuyama's argument even further, the Abuja treaty was rejected by the two main rebel groups (the Fur-backed SLA-Nour and the semi-ideologically Islamist JEM) that are NOT primarily Zaghawa in their identity, i.e. it was ONLY embraced by the tribe that he sees as "related to Chad".

It has broken down not simply because of recalcitrance in Khartoum, but because it did not meet the political demands of the Darfurian rebels.

Yes, but those demands were more related to more compensation money, more local power, less Khartum interference, and better posts in government, on the SPLA precedent; and to demands for better mechanisms ensuring the government's compliance. The refusal had very little to do with a wish of becoming independent -- or for that matter, join Chad, if anyone ever dreamt of that.

In the long run, I don’t see any reasons why Darfur should not have the same options as southern Sudan: it should either be granted full autonomy under its own political leadership, or it should become part of Chad if that is what the local population wants.

Now, I find it hard to believe there are people even in Sudan who are yearning to become part of Chad, other than as a last resort to escape the muderous tactics of the Khartoum government and its allies.

But I find it even more incredible that Francis Fukuyama can pose as an expert on this, when he has apparently just flipped through some Wikipedia articles on Sudan after realizing, 40 years after everybody else, that African borders aren't very well-drawn.

to those interested in the horn of africa and the sudan conflict, somebody sent me this fascinating piece about the politics of the save darfur campaign in the US. why did a campaign start in the US and not europe? the piece is a little outdated - now that the black community has largely pulled away from the movement - but the analysis is still relevant i think:

article from middle east report:
http://www.merip.org/mer/mer234/aidi.html

So, Niger's deporting another 150 K of angry and dispossessed Mahamid nomads into the other flank of Chad, I think could well turn out ugly for all involved. Yet the BBC doesn't seem to have made any connection yet between the Darfur/East Chad mess and this -- isn't there one, am I misunderstanding this?

I think there is no strong connection as the members of this ethnic group have been present and settled for some generations. The Arab nomadic tribes settled from Sudan to Niger do not have some pan-Arab identity or state aspirations (the total opposite would be the Kurdish movement for example) so the expulsion seems to be a function of poverty and lack of resources within Niger itself. I cannot see these repatriations adding any fuel to the fire in Darfur but it did catch my eye.

The Fukuyama article I'm afraid is rather idiotic and shallow which is uncharacteristic. Alle's deconstruction is accurate, however this is what did for me,

The root of so many of Africa’s contemporary problems is that it has inherited a state structure from European colonialism that makes no sense, leaving states that are either too large and diverse, like Sudan

No shit Sherlock, I've read term papers that had more profound analysis. I don't understand why people feel the need to be universal experts.

but I'm not sure I buy the idea implied in his writing that every single separatist group in every single African (or wherever) country has to be given its own autonomous area or separate nation or whatever.

Agreed, he's just his throwing in his two cents.

Juanjo, interesting article, the issue of denial of race issues in the Arab World is a legitimate one, deserves extended commentary methinks.

Re Chad's oil, fuck knows, any ideas?