For their part, the Israelis have agreed that they won't insist on an immediate disarmament of Hizbollah; and according to Ynet news, "The French and Lebanese armies will take part in the multinational peacekeeping force expected to take position along the southern Lebanese border, it was revealed following a meeting between US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Prime Minister Ehud Olmert in Jerusalem."

Of course, it remains to be seen if the two sides will be able to go from agreeing in principle to actually ceasing to shoot at each other. (Update: Or to stop bombing buildings full of refugees, which has a tendency to slow down diplomacy, oddly enough.)

Jonathan Steele in the Guardian argues that Hizbollah has some room to retreat should the actual UN resolution not be to their liking:

Although Siniora expressed support for strengthening Unifil, analysts assume he thought this position was safe as long as the mandate and mission are still to be agreed. If the idea took off he would have time to argue that it can only come in with the consent of Hizbullah and Amal.

And although Israel has in the past said they will be willing to turn the Shebaa Farms over to Lebanon should Syria formally agree that it is Lebanese territory, the draft UN proposal reported here by AP doesn't seem to include that territorial concession, nor does it discuss a prisoner exchange, as opposed to a return of the prisoners to Israel. It's hard to see HIzbollah agreeing to such a deal, especially since it seems to be holding its own so far (and winning a great deal of acclaim across the Arab world for doing so) in clashes in the south of the country.

Even with those concessions, Hizbollah has also previously indicated it won't accept any peace that would injure its "dignity", which in practical terms seems to roughly equate to its weapons. The details of the rules of engagement of the proposed international force, as well as of the proposed disarmament of Hizbollah, will likely determine whether the organization can in fact be brought on board for a ceasefire, as well as how well the ceasefire will hold.

Hizbollah will push for a gradual disarmament through a political process, aiming for one that moves as briskly as the process towards abolition of political sectarianism agreed on in the Taif accords in 1989. This is likely to be de facto endorsed by the Lebanese government and most of the rest of the world, if only to get the shooting to stop. On the other hand, Israel, America and possibly Britain will want a more "robust" disarmament.

This will come out in the mandate for the international force (whoever that turns out to be). In particular, will they be required to seek out and destroy or confiscate Hizbollah arms caches and fortifications? Or will their role be limited to overseeing arms transfers agreed upon through the political process?
If the international force is asked to proactively seek out Hizbollah weapons stores, the process is probably doomed from the start, even in the unlikely event that Hizbollah agrees to it. Given the amount of materiel that is stored -- or at least is believed to be stored -- in private residences, the spectre of foreign troops conducting house-to-house searches (with men standing around in their underwear with their hands on their heads and hijab'd women screaming in Arabic) would pretty quickly arise, and things would almost certainly deteriorate from there.
On the other hand, a purely political process, even one sincerely engaged in, is likely to leave Israel and anti-Hizbollah Lebanese feeling that they've been conned, and that nothing has been accomplished.

Another interesting question with respect to the theoretical international force's mandate is whether Israel will agree to stop its overflights of Lebanese territory along its borders. This has been a continual source of low-level irritation in Lebanese-Israeli relations over the past 6 years, and at least theoretically the international takeover of security along the border would obviate Israel's need for such flights, but it is hard to see Israel trusting the international forces sufficiently to agree to such a step.