Some further background:

WASHINGTON, Jan 11 (Reuters) -he U.S. Army has displayed damaging cultural insensitivity in Iraq, while being blinded by unrealistic optimism and predisposed to use maximum force, a senior British officer wrote in a blistering appraisal in a U.S. military publication.

The essay by British Army Brigadier Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who served with U.S. forces in Iraq from December 2003 to November 2004, appeared in the latest edition of the magazine Military Review, published by the U.S. Army.

I'd note that before this fiasco got started I warned (for the SDMB readers then) that I was deeply concerned US forces would committ the same sins as in Somalia, etc., as using air strikes against urban guerillas.

Aylwin-Foster said U.S. Army personnel struggled to grasp the nuances of battling insurgents while also winning the hearts and minds of ordinary Iraqis.

“Moreover, whilst they were almost unfailingly courteous and considerate, at times their cultural insensitivity, almost certainly inadvertent, arguably amounted to institutional racism,” Aylwin-Foster wrote, arguing that the Army exacerbated the task it now faces by alienating significant parts of the Iraqi population.

Ignorance, in short. Ignorance and lack of proper training to overcome the same.

The utility here is the criticism can not be said to be coming from a hater of the soldiers (and there are surely those, especially on the Looney Left) or of US action as such.

Other critics also have accused the U.S. military of a lack of understanding of Iraqi and Islamic culture. The military concedes that the vast majority of U.S. troops do not know Arabic, and has launched an effort costing $750 million over five years to improve foreign language skills in the ranks.

Foreign language skills, fine, but in the end I think this is unworkable. You can't take a few tens of thousands of under-educated foot soldiers and teach them a hard language like Arabic, while also expecting other things from them. Forming key "interlocutors" is probably smarter.

That being said, even without language, solid training in less offensive combat oriented, more policing oriented habits (a la non-American units in Iraq which, ceteris paribus, had less problems) and some cultural training would have gone some ways to reducing problems. By no means perfect, but I recall vividly the anger of my good friend in US Mil intell (an Arabist) that his troops were not being given this kind of information.

‘DAMAGING OPTIMISM’

Aylwin-Foster, whose rank equates to a one-star U.S. general, referred to U.S. Army officers’ “damaging optimism” that seemed out of touch with a more sobering reality

“Self-belief and resilient optimism are recognized necessities for successful command, and all professional forces strive for a strong can-do ethos. However, it is unhelpful if it discourages junior commanders from reporting unwelcome news up the chain of command,” he wrote.

“Force commanders and political masters need to know the true state of affairs if they are to reach timely decisions to change plans: arguably, they did not always do so,” he added.

I find this interesting.

Reflecting on when I was directly working on Iraqi projects - investment of course - and the briefings we received, ones that already by Summer of 2003 had begun to diverge so far from reality as "we" (the regional business community) were seeing with whacked shipments, etc., I find the above comments interesting, evocative.

I find particularly evocative in the context of a few personal conversations with several briefing officers who happened to be alumni of my own graduate university. Summer of 2003, when Happy Talk was de rigeur, these folks off the record spoke to a situation that was clearly spiraling out of control with loss of control of routes, etc.

Yet the happy talk went on.

A dangerous, dangerous self-delusion at some level.

Our fine little Lefties too often attribute this to venality and to, in particular, venality in the Bush Administration. Certainly it struck me there was delusional, ideologically driven venality in the staffing and execution of the CPA-Iraq civilian staff (again it still boggles my mind that no one tried to recruit me, although I knew them well and was very well regarded in US circles - evidenced by the closed things I was invited to attend, not merely my ego) which was filled with neophytes, amateurs straight out of undergraduate school and without the slightest clue as to the region, lagnuage, habits....

Another interesting point extracted, one that I may add goes well to some 90 percent of the online "Pro" commenary:

Aylwin-Foster faulted “moral righteousness” felt by U.S.personnel that “encouraged the erroneous assumption that given the justness of the cause, actions that occurred in its name would be understood and accepted by the population, even if mistakes and civilian fatalities occurred in the implementation.”

This is fundamentally important as it continues to contaminate clear thinking.

I've called this navel gazing.

Self deception.

It is a deadly disease, but hardly unique to the US. The problem is understanding that it is occuring and understanding it has to be fixed. Too frequently this is understood as "giving in" to the enemy.

Taking it out of the military context, and placing it in a business context it becomes clearer. It is rather like the tension between Marketing and Engineering. Engineering always loves to over-engineer and bring out the big (tech) guns to solve a problem, assuming the end client thinks just like the Engineer. The problem, however, is of course the disconnect between Engineer perception of a problem, and what end-user may want (and seperately, need).

Too often the Engineering end resents the imposition of marketing-ish feedeback as spoiling the best solution, etc. However, if one creates a product that everyone hates.... You have in fact solved nothing.

A somewhat inexact analogy, but the challenge for Americans is understanding that rightness or wrongness of their positions, tactics or strategies are, in the court of winning over a target customer (some good portion of Iraqi opinion) secondary to perception. Not unrelated to be sure, but rather than trumpeting what they think is important, it would do well to learn more about what the enemy (and real potential enemies) really thinks (and not what you think they think).

Aylwin-Foster said U.S. forces in Iraq were more disposed to use offensive military operations than the forces of coalition partners, and U.S. rules of engagement “were more lenient than other nations’, thus encouraging earlier escalation.”

No news in a sense, US forces have been on convenetional war style footing. Using gunships in urban areas clearly indicated that.

Aylwin-Foster lauded the U.S. Army’s sense of patriotism and its talent, and said it was “in no way lacking in humanity or compassion.”

“Yet it seemed weighed down by bureaucracy, a stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a predisposition to offensive operations, and a sense that duty required all issues to be confronted head-on.”

Or, in short, US mil doctrine and style requires a boxing match, rather than engaging in something more subtle.

[Now, the original commentary on The Washington Post arty]

Army's Iraq Work Assailed by Briton
Senior Officer Points to Cultural Ignorance In an Essay Published by the U.S. Military
By Thomas E. Ricks
Washington Post Staff Writer
Wednesday, January 11, 2006

First, the positive:

FORT LEAVENWORTH, Kan. -- A senior British officer has written a scathing critique of the U.S. Army and its performance in Iraq, accusing it of cultural ignorance, moralistic self-righteousness, unproductive micromanagement and unwarranted optimism there.

His publisher: the U.S. Army.

Looking outside your own peeps for this kind of "Wake the Fuck Up out of the Idiotic Self-Deluding Navel-Gazing" is a good thing.

In an article published this week in the Army magazine Military Review, British Brig. Nigel Aylwin-Foster, who was deputy commander of a program to train the Iraqi military, said American officers in Iraq displayed such "cultural insensitivity" that it "arguably amounted to institutional racism" and may have spurred the growth of the insurgency. The Army has been slow to adapt its tactics, he argues, and its approach during the early stages of the occupation "exacerbated the task it now faces by alienating significant sections of the population."

Alienation of the population, generalised cultural insensitivity (natural if they have poor orientation and general training aimed at offensive operations).

The decision by the Army magazine to publish the essay -- which already has provoked an intense reaction among American officers -- is part of a broader self-examination occurring in many parts of the Army as it approaches the end of its third year of fighting in Iraq.

This, by the way, is a very good sign.

Military Review, which is based here along with many of the Army's educational institutions, has been part of that examination, becoming increasingly influential and pointed under the editorship of Col. William M. Darley. In the past two years, his magazine has run articles that have sharply criticized U.S. military operations in Iraq. A piece last summer by then-Maj. Gen. Peter W. Chiarelli about how to better counter the insurgency has become required reading for officers deploying to Iraq -- especially since Chiarelli was recently selected to become the No. 2 American officer there.

Interesting data point. It might be that realism may slowly seep into
the blind self confident simple-minded moralism that can be so very charming as well as so very blinding, and is so very common among US Mil types.

Some Talleyrandesque cynicism.

But none of the earlier articles has been as bluntly critical of the Army as the essay by Aylwin-Foster, whose assessment is also unusual because it comes from a senior military commander with the closest ally the U.S. government has in Iraq.

Sometimes someone else has to hold up the mirror.

And one must inevitably also note that the cruel note to the friend who's wildly and idiotically off-base on his reads is not bieng his enemy, its sincerer friendship.

The Army is full of soldiers showing qualities such as patriotism, duty, passion and talent, writes Aylwin-Foster, whose rank is equivalent to a U.S. one-star general. "Yet," he continues, "it seemed weighed down by bureaucracy, a stiflingly hierarchical outlook, a predisposition to offensive operations, and a sense that duty required all issues to be confronted head-on."

Surprise, surprise.

This should come as no news to any who has had the most tangential interactions with US Mil.

More to the point:

Those traits reflect the Army's traditional focus on conventional state-on-state wars and are seen by some experts as less appropriate for counterinsurgency, which they say requires patience, cultural understanding and a willingness to use innovative and counterintuitive approaches, such as employing only the minimal amount of force necessary. In counterinsurgency campaigns, Aylwin-Foster argues, "the quick solution is often the wrong one."

Emphasis added.

Precisely.

Precisely.

Precisely.

Penny-wise short term massive force protection measures that generate more medium term resistance.

He said he found that an intense pressure to conform and overcentralized decision making slowed the Army's operations in Iraq, giving the enemy time to understand and respond to U.S. moves. And the Army's can-do spirit, he wrote, encouraged a "damaging optimism" that interfered with realistic assessments of the situation in Iraq.

Damaging optimism I think is the perfect phrase for the insane self-deception the US has engaged in iwth respect to both the wider MENA region and Iraq in particular.

Continuing:

"Such an ethos is unhelpful if it discourages junior commanders from reporting unwelcome news up the chain of command," Aylwin-Foster says. A pervasive sense of righteousness or moral outrage, he adds, further distorted military judgments, especially in the handling of fighting in Fallujah.

Indeed.

Lt. Gen. David Petraeus, who runs much of the Army's educational establishment, and also oversees Military Review, said he does not agree with many of Aylwin-Foster's assertions. But Petraeus, who commanded Aylwin-Foster in Iraq, said "he is a very good officer, and therefore his viewpoint has some importance, as we do not think it is his alone."

No, indeed not his alone.

Widely shared by people not inside the Military bubble.

Reflecting that ambivalence, the article was published with two disclaimers -- one in the form of an introduction, the other as a footnote -- which make clear that the views expressed do not reflect those of the British government, the British military, the U.S. Army, its Combined Arms Center or Military Review.

"I think he's an insufferable British snob," said Col. Kevin Benson, commander of the Army's elite School of Advanced Military Studies, referring to Aylwin-Foster. Benson said he plans a rebuttal.

To translate the bolded text, "He's a furriner who has no right to say anything about our Great American Forces."

Or simple jingoism

"I think he's overstating the case," said another military intellectual here, retired Col. Gregory Fontenot, who led U.S. forces into Bosnia in 1995. But he added, "whether he's right or wrong, what's important is that the Army understands it has a problem, which it does."

Fair comment that one.

Darley, the review's editor, is holding his ground. "We've had some very strong reaction as to why the Military Review would even consider publishing this," he said as he strolled across the grounds of Fort Leavenworth last week. He said he did so because he wants "to win the war" in Iraq.

Good, good thinking. Stop shying away from hard criticism and create a baseline to work from for creating new goals.

Or one can continue as the Americans are: self-deception and magical thinking.